It was a multi-billion dollar technological masterpiece of military engineering.
Each battery was equipped with air conditioned personal quarters, a sophisticated fire control communication network, state of the art weaponry, even an underground railway system linking each position together.
The Maginot Line was painstakingly designed, maintained at great cost, and meticulously rehearsed to defeat the German invasion of 1914 through absorbing a first-strike and counterattacking. But 1914 had come and gone, and it was 1940 that condemned the 3rd French Republic to the most humiliating defeat of a World Power in modern warfare. How could such a thing happen?
France was objectively stronger than Germany in 1940 in terms of economic GDP, armored divisions, aircraft, and soldiers – not even counting the 316,000 strong British Expeditionary Force - yet was forced to surrender in six weeks to a nation whom the Third Republic had written off a decade before. Their fate was sealed not solely by Panzerkorps Guderian smashing through the Ardennes, but by their timidity and fear of seeming aggressive. A nation apprehensive of future conflict will seek out the best way to protect their interests with the least potential loss of life, no matter the financial costs.
The investment that the United States Department of Defense is currently pouring into the Missile Defense Agency is a dangerous analogue to a modern Maginot Line, a defensive structure designed for the last war fought, marvels of engineering that can be rendered undone by an enemy displaying the sort of initiative that was displayed in 1940. Such commitment to missile defense must be appropriately balanced with the realization that such weaponry cannot win wars alone, and in the end, can only at most serve only as support for the offensive.
History is rife with examples of catastrophic defeat brought on by the obsession with defense. Defense is seductive, for at its core it is the stronger form of warfare, and builds upon the things that all generals are comfortably familiar with: lessons learned from prior experience.
Such strength, however, comes at the cost of surrendering the initiative to the enemy. “In the pure defensive,” wrote Carl von Clausewitz, “The positive object is wanting, and therefore, while on the defensive, our forces cannot at the same time be directed upon other objects; they can only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy.”
In 1925, the French General Staff, shaken by the horrific loss of French lives on the Western Front and faced with a suddenly tightening military budget, sought to build an unbreakable defense to deter further attack, instead of discussing how to best use the new technologies of tanks and aircraft for purposes of offensive doctrine.
Modern American policy makers, caught in a similar situation after the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, must take care not to fall into a similar passively-minded trap. At a time when the Army is being cut across the board, the only branch of the service that is being significantly expanded is the Air Defense Artillery. Even as each post in the Army is being forced to disband a brigade apiece, Air Defense and the Missile Defense Agency have never received such a high proportion of budgetary spending. In 2011, the DoD requested that $9.9 billion be set aside for the Ballistic Missile Defense System, a slice of the budgetary pie second only to the overhyped and over-budget F-35 Lightning II.
For comparison, BMDS received a portion equal to one-third of the entire budget of the U.S. Marine Corps that year. This allotment of funds is matched by the high tempo deployments of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) batteries to both the Middle East and Pacific theaters.
After the wide publicity that the Patriot system received protecting Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against Saddam’s SCUDs in 2003, it is not surprising that the Army is currently fielding ADA units all over the world. Such deployments show resolve and commitment to allies, as well as having the bonus of not appearing too bellicose to temperamental adversaries. Now, with an air defense unit in place, commanders can draw a circle around defended assets, confidently claiming an unassailable shield against any enemy attack.
The only trouble is that there is no such thing as an invincible defense. Constantinople’s double walls were stormed by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1453. The Great Wall of China, largest fortification in the world, fell to Manchu invaders in 1644. The ‘invincible’ Fort Eben-Emael was taken by 56 German glider troops in 1940.
The 1986 Chicago Bears, “Monsters of the Midway”, lost in the first playoff round to the Redskins. The examples of defeat are limitless and point to the same flaw. A defensive force may deter or hold for a time, but it must be followed by offensive action or the attacker will inevitably discover a weakness and smash through.
This is a known failing of the defensive war of war. Even chapter 3 of Army FM 3-90.6 states: “The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that enables Army forces to regain the initiative.”
In practice, however, Army policy gives the lie to Army doctrine. The vaunted ‘shift to the Pacific’ relies more heavily on missile defense contracted from Lockheed Martin (THAAD), Boeing/Lockheed (AEGIS) and Raytheon (Patriot) than any other deployment in history.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has hundreds of tactical ballistic missiles, but for all the posturing of North Korea, the rogue state pales in comparison to the People’s Republic of China. China, whose rising nationalism and expansionism have not gone unnoticed by the Pentagon, has weighted her military exercises and equipment explicitly towards defeating American missile defense and naval assets.
As a matter of procurement, it will always be cheaper and faster to build a basic guided tactical ballistic missile (TBM) than interceptors designed to shoot down that missile. Considering the massive bases and logistical structure necessary for the U.S. Air Force and Navy to operate, it is not difficult for an enemy to determine the most cost-effective localities to target its weapons.
In a war of attrition - which is all that ballistic missile defense boils down to - massed volleys of TBMs have the potential of overwhelming and destroying its air defense units across the Pacific. Even in the face of such a scenario, the Department of Defense insists on procuring ever more and more Patriot and THAAD batteries and AEGIS-armed warships. The effective response from our adversaries is already in progress – just build more ballistic missiles to overwhelm them.
Increased American military presence in the Pacific will lead to escalating tensions with others seeking to expand their reach there; there is little doubt about that. What remains to be seen is how these other players in the region will maneuver in the widely publicized view of U.S. missile defense, and the countermeasures that they will continue to refine to defeat it.
In the event of an open war - which is oft the historical case between a rising power and a power in denial about its fading strength - what will happen if the Maginot Line of the Ballistic Missile Defense System fails to be little more than a speed bump? The offensive is the nature of a victorious armed force, and the Department of Defense should be more mindful of history’s lessons as we move forward into the uncharted waters of the Western Pacific.
"Basil Hart" is an active duty Army officer and a missile defense expert. His views and opinions do not represent those of the Department of Defense.